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I
“The meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts
and how those parts are put together.” Such is the observation that sup-
ports the demand that semantic theories, ‘theories of meaning’, should
be compositional. Very roughly, the demand is that such theories should
characterize the meanings of sentences (and other sorts of complex ex-
pressions) ‘recursively’, by ascribing meaning to sub-sentential expres-
sions, and to various forms of syntactic combination, and then deriv-
ing the meanings of sentences therefrom. Only a theory that met this
constraint, it is thought, could properly be described as answering the
question how the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings
of its parts and the way the parts are combined.1
There are a number of problems that arise in connection with the
question how the principle of compositionality should properly be for-
mulated. I shall not be discussing these issues here. What I want to
discuss, rather, is the question whether compositionality is a substan-
tial constraint at all. Paul Horwich (1997), among others, has argued
that it is not, in part because it is an utterly trivial matter to formulate
semantic theories that are compositional.2 I shall explain what sorts of
‘semantic theories’ Horwich has in mind shortly.
I shall argue, as against Horwich, that the trivial semantic theories
he formulates not only do not explain the phenomenon of compositional-
1 The locus classicus for this conception is of course Davidson’s paper “Truth and
Meaning” (Davidson, 1984).
2 This paper is essentially reprinted in Horwich’s book Meaning (Horwich, 1998),
with some minor changes. Page references in the text are given in the form “000/000",
with the first pages number(s) referring to the paper; the second, to the book. Terrence
Parsons (1996) and Mark Johnston (1998) have expressed relevantly similar views, and
they have since become common among self-described deflationists.
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ity but are explanatorily wholly vacuous. I firmly believe that the argu-
ments I shall offer are conclusive against Horwich’s particular attempt
to evade the constraints that the structured, articulated character of
language is usually thought to impose on semantic theory. Since I do
not myself see any other way of evading these constraints, I believe that
these arguments also establish that compositionality is a substantive
constraint, but I do not claim as much for the arguments on this score.
Nor, just to be clear, do I claim that they establish any particular ver-
sion of the thesis of compositionality, whose detailed formulation, as I
have already said, is a matter of some controversy.
The view I want to refute is thus that compositionality imposes no
substantial constraints upon semantic theories, because the alleged con-
straint is trivially satisfiable. How so? Very roughly, the idea is this.
Consider a simple sentence, such as “dogs bark”. This sentence means
that dogs bark.3 Introducing some notation, it means: dogs bark.4 The
problem is to see how this fact, that “dogs bark” means dogs bark, might
be seen as determined by facts about the meanings of the words “dogs”
and “bark” and how they are combined in the sentence “dogs bark”. For-
mally, the problem is to formulate a theory in which the fact that “dogs
bark” means dogs bark is derivable from assumed facts about the mean-
ings of these words and the semantic significance of the relevant mode
of combination.
Horwich claims that it is easy to formulate a theory meeting the
mentioned requirements, roughly as follows (506/158):
• “dogs” means dogs;
• “bark” means bark;
• a sentence of the form N-V means:
CompN−V (the meaning of N, the meaning of V);
• “dogs bark” is a sentence of the form N-V.
Here, “CompN−V ” denotes a function from meanings to meanings sat-
isfying the following condition, which I am quoting from Horwich and
which I shall call COMP (529/180):
3 I shall here ignore the complexities introduced by context-dependence. Accounting
for them can only make matters worse.
4 Horwich uses capital letters, thus: DOGS BARK. Parsons uses the more traditional
circumflex, thus: ^(dogs bark). I use underlining for neutrality, and because it is easier
to read.
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The meaning of the result of applying combinatorial proce-
dure P to a sequence of primitives = The result of applying P
to the sequence of the meanings of those primitives.
The first four premises imply that “dogs bark” means CompN−V (dogs,
bark), and it is then supposed to follow from COMP that dogs bark
= CompN−V (dogs, bark). (Thus, N-V is a “combinatorial procedure”.)
So, says Horwich, from the stated assumptions, we can derive that
“dogs bark” means dogs bark, which is “just what we wanted to explain”
(506/157). Thus, the theory shows us how the meaning of this sentence
is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are combined.
It seems plausible that the theory can easily be extended to other sorts
of sentences, so we seem to have been given a recipe for a compositional
theory of meaning for the whole of English.
Horwich remarks that his main claim is “that compositionality im-
poses no constraint on how the meaning properties of the primitives are
constituted” (509/159-60). Theories of meaning of this kind, which we
may call direct meaning-theories, are neutral regarding such matters as
whether the meaning of a (primitive) predicate is a set, or a property, or
whatever, or whether the meaning of a proper name is its referent: More
generally, direct meaning-theories are supposed to make no non-trivial
assumptions about what sorts of things the meanings of primitive ex-
pressions are. On the other hand, Horwich does commit himself to a
specific view about the meanings of sentences.5 On this “deflationary
proposal”, a sentence’s meaning what it does just consists in its being
constructed in the way it is from parts that mean whatever they do:
For “dogs bark” to mean dogs bark just is for it to be constructed, via
the combinatorial procedure N-V, from words meaning what “dogs” and
“bark” do, viz., dogs and bark (504-5/155-6). Horwich’s thesis is that, if
we accept his deflationary conception of what constitutes a sentence’s
meaning what it does—his “constitutive thesis”, as I shall call it—it is
a trivial matter to explain how the meaning of a complex expression is
determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are combined.
Not everyone who has been attracted by the simplicity of meaning-
theories of this kind has endorsed Horwich’s constitutive thesis. I shall
consider its significance later. I will first argue that direct meaning-
theories are, by themselves, explanatorily vacuous: Despite appear-
5 And other complex expressions. Henceforth, I shall speak just of sentences, leaving
it understood that remarks applying to them are also supposed to apply to other sorts
of complex expressions.
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ances, a direct meaning-theory does not allow us to explain how the
meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts.
II
In the context of a direct meaning-theory, claims about how a sentence
is constructed from its parts (and, indeed, what its parts are) play no
essential role: Such theories are, in a sense I shall explain, insensitive
to facts about the structures of sentences. Let me illustrate this phe-
nomenon. The story I told above about how the meaning of the sentence
“dogs bark” is determined by the meanings of its parts differs from the
story Horwich tells. His story appeals to the following principles:
• “dog” means dog;
• “bark” means bark;
• a sentence of the form Ns-V means:
CompNs−V (the meaning of N, the meaning of V);
• “dogs bark” is a sentence of the form Ns-V.
The difference here is that the two theories ascribe different structures
to the sentence “dogs bark” and so explain its meaning dogs bark in
different ways. My story speaks of the meaning of “dogs” and treats
this sentence as being of the form N-V. Horwich’s story, on the other
hand, speaks of the meaning of “dog” and treats the sentence as being
of the form Ns-V. One might prefer Horwich’s treatment on a number
of grounds. One might, for example, think it a mistake to suppose that
“dogs” is a primitive whose meaning has nothing to do with that of “dog”:
On this view, the word “dogs” is, despite superficial appearances, seman-
tically complex, consisting of the common noun “dog” and the plural af-
fix “-s”.6 What is puzzling, however, is that, so far as these theories’
6 Similarly, it is widely thought that the affixes by means of which tense is expressed
in English are the morphological realization of underlying syntactic features of (tensed)
sentences. In that sense, we might say that “-ed” is a word—an expression with inde-
pendent semantic significance—even though it is not realized as what we call a “word”
in ordinary English. And if one adopts such a view, then one should also say that “ran”
is the morphological realization of what is, at a deeper level, just what one would expect
it to be, namely, “runned” (or something like that).
Anyone familiar with actual work in semantics will recognize that there are deeper
issues here, since the most usual reading of “dogs bark” treats it as a generic. (It has
other readings as well: “What happens at night in the country?” “Dogs bark.”)
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ability to deliver the wanted theorems is concerned, it just doesn’t seem
to matter whether my theory is correct, or Horwich’s theory is correct,
or, indeed, whether neither of them is.
Here’s another example. Consider the sentence “John believes that
pigs fly”. In older work, it is often treated as consisting of a noun-phrase,
“John”, an operator, “believes that”, and the sentence on which it oper-
ates, “pigs fly”. Contemporary syntacticians, on the other hand, regard
the sentence as consisting (very roughly) of the noun-phrase, “John”, a
transitive verb, “believes”, taking a clausal complement, and the com-
plement itself, “that pigs fly”.7 The issue here is not which of these views
is correct.
On the contrary, so far as a direct meaning-theory’s ability to deliver
the wanted theorems is concerned, it doesn’t matter which of them is
correct. That’s what I mean when I say that direct meaning-theories
are insensitive to claims about the structures of sentences. There is
thus a gap between a direct meaning-theory’s issuing in derivations of
such claims as that “dogs bark” means dogs bark and its explaining
these facts. Consider again the two theories given above concerning
the sentence “dogs bark”. Although these theories attribute different
structures to the sentence, this difference does not affect the theories’
ability to deliver the required theorems: The derivation of the claim
that “dogs bark” means dogs bark proceeds unhindered, whatever we
take its structure to be. Surely, however, not both theories can count
as explaining why “dogs bark” means dogs bark. But on what ground
can we ascribe one of the two theories greater explanatory force than
the other? It seems to me that if either counts as explaining why “dogs
bark” means dogs bark, then both do. So neither does.
The reply, however, will surely be that we cannot regard a direct
meaning-theory as explaining why a sentence means what it does un-
less it ascribes the right structure to the sentence in question. Note
first, however, that, if it is a substantial question what the structure
of a certain sentence actually is, then it is a good deal less easy to ex-
tend Horwich’s theory to one for the whole of English than he seems to
suppose: To explain how the meaning of a given sentence is determined
7 Of course, this is massively over-simplified, and there are further questions about
the structure of the complement, in any event. But we need not pause over such matters
here.
The contemporary view is well-supported. To get a sense for the reasons in favor of
it, note that the complementizer “that” moves with the clause: We say, “That pigs fly is
something John believes”, not “Pigs fly is something John believes that”.
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by the meanings of its parts one must, presumably, figure out what the
structure of that sentence actually is. Horwich’s explanation of how the
meaning of “dogs bark” depends upon the meanings of its parts, and
how they are put together, therefore cannot be regarded as obviously
correct: It will be correct only if “dogs bark” is of the form “Ns-V”, and
that claim can be questioned. Indeed, it is obviously false.
But, the reply will continue, though it is indeed hard to say what
the structures of certain sorts of sentences are, whatever their struc-
tures may be, there has to be a direct meaning-theory that attributes
those structures—which are, by hypothesis, the right structures—to
those sentences. So it is obvious that there is a direct meaning-theory
that assigns the right structures to the sentences and allows us to de-
rive facts about their meanings from facts about the meanings of their
parts and how they are combined, even if we don’t yet know which di-
rect meaning-theory that is. If so, isn’t it also obvious that some direct
meaning-theory will explain how the meanings of English sentences are
determined by the meanings of their parts?
The answer, or so I shall argue, is “No”: Even a direct meaning-
theory that ascribes the right structures to sentences fails to explain,
e.g., how the meaning of “dogs bark” is determined by the meanings of
its parts and how they are combined. The problem is that, since any
structure will do, direct meaning-theories have no grip on the notion of
“right structure”.
There are many different notions of a sentence’s structure: Surface
structure, deep structure, phonological structure, and so forth, not to
mention orthographic structure and grammatical structure in the ordi-
nary sense. Horwich cannot simply stipulate the notion of structure he
wishes to employ. Suppose he did so—call that notion “H-form”—and
rewrite his direct meaning-theory thus:
• “dog” means dog;
• “bark” means bark;
• A sentence that has the H-form Ns-V means:
CompNs−V (the meaning of N, the meaning of V);
• “dogs bark” has the H-form Ns-V.
Of course, I can just re-write my theory thus:
• “dogs” means dogs;
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• “bark” means bark;
• A sentence that has the grammatical form N-V means:
CompN−V (the meaning of N, the meaning of V);
• “dogs bark” has the grammatical form N-V.
Both theories assign a correct structure to “dogs bark”, by hypothesis,
and there will be many more besides. What reason can there be, then,
to regard one rather than another of these theories as explaining why
“dogs bark” means dogs bark? The answer, presumably, is that, while
sentences do have many different sorts of structure, there is no reason
to suppose that all of these structures are ones it would be appropriate
to use in stating a meaning-theory. The problem with the ‘grammatical’
theory, then, is that it uses an inappropriate notion of structure.
Before we can even begin to formulate a meaning-theory, then—
before we can even begin to answer the question what ‘the’ structure
of a given sentence might be—we need to know what notion of structure
is supposed to be relevant. How, then, would Horwich have us identify
the notion of structure relevant to questions about compositionality? I
have heard it suggested that Horwich should defer to syntax, so that
the relevant notion of structure is just whatever the syntacticians say it
is. But syntacticians themselves standardly distinguish various levels
of representation, and compositionality plays a crucial role in identify-
ing the level at which semantic interpretation is supposed to occur. The
emergence of LF (for “logical form”) in the 1970s was driven in large part
by the need to identify a level of representation at which compositional
accounts of the meanings of sentences—in particular, of quantifiers—
could be given. Since the scopes of quantifiers are not represented at
surface structure, no compositional explanation can be given at that
level of why, say, “everyone read most of the books” means what it does,
rather than what “most of the books were read by everyone” means. So
another level, LF, is needed.8
It has thus long been the standard view, not just in philosophy, but
also in linguistics, that assignments of logical form to sentences must
8 There are alternatives, to be sure, and, even within the Chomskyan tradition, syn-
tactic theory has been in flux in recent years, but the points made here still stand.
In so-called Direct Compositionality accounts, for example, the structure is relatively
simple, but the rules for semantic interpretation become much more complicated than
Horwich’s picture would allow.
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support a compositional semantics for them.9 But Horwich cannot ac-
cept such an account of LF’s importance. It is far too easy to extend his
theory to encompass any new construction one would like, for example,
adverbs:
• “loudly” means loudly;
• A sentence of the form S-Adv means:
CompS−Adv(the meaning of S, the meaning of Adv);
• “dogs bark loudly” is a sentence of the form S-Adv.
Now we can derive that “dogs bark loudly” means dogs bark loudly.
Or again: One might have thought that it was only with Frege’s intro-
duction of the notion of quantification—and more importantly, of the
notion of scope—that we were in any position at all to understand why
“Everyone loves someone” means what it does. But there is an obvi-
ous direct meaning-theory that makes no use of the notion of scope,
and that treats “Everyone loves someone” as being of the same form as
“John loves Sue”, and yet allows us to derive that “Everyone loves some-
one” means everyone loves someone. It should, furthermore, be obvious
that structural ambiguities will pose no difficulty. If we want to explain
the ambiguity of “everyone loves someone”, we need only identify two
possible structures for it, say, “Q1 − V − Q2” and “Q1 − V ∗ − Q2”, and
give appropriate compositional principles for such structures. As long
as their are enough structures to go around, it won’t matter what they
are.
So, as said, Horwich cannot just stipulate which notion of structure
direct meaning-theories are supposed to employ. He cannot, e.g., simply
insist that grade school grammar books will tell us all we need to know.
We need to be told why one notion of structure, rather than some other,
is the one appropriate for use in explanations of the semantic proper-
ties of expressions: why, to put the point in Horwich’s own terms, a sen-
tence’s meaning what it does consists in its being composed in that way
from parts that mean what they do, rather than in some other way. And
what I have just been arguing is that Horwich simply co-opt the stan-
dard answer to this sort of question, since that answer depends upon a
conception of the explanatory burden imposed by compositionality that
9 And it is then a substantial question how, in this theoretical context, composition-
ality should best be understood. This is the sort of problem I mentioned towards the
beginning of the paper.
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he rejects. And I know of no other answer. But without one, there is
no principled way to choose among the far too many direct meaning-
theories we can construct: to distinguish the one that is supposed to
be explanatorily adequate from the great majority whose explanatory
vacuity is obvious.
III
It’s easy to think there has to be something wrong with the foregoing.
Let us, therefore, consider directly the question why direct meaning-
theories are so plentiful. As we shall see, it is because they are almost
devoid of content.
It will simplify the exposition if we resolve, at this point, to treat
terms of the form “dogs”—which are supposed to mean something like
“the meaning of the word ‘dogs’”—as semantically complex. Horwich
says that such terms are “primitive” (524/175), and this seems to be his
official view. But he ought not to have said this: To insist that “dogs”
is primitive is to undermine our understanding of the principle COMP,
that is, of how meanings are supposed to compose, on Horwich’s view.
Recall that COMP, as Horwich states it, is:
The meaning of the result of applying combinatorial proce-
dure P to a sequence of primitives = The result of applying P
to the sequence of the meanings of those primitives.
Horwich never states this principle using the quasi-formal machinery
he employs elsewhere, and for good reason. If we attempt to formalize
the principle, the best we can do would seem to be something like this:
CompN−V (x,y) = N-V(x,y).
Here, ‘x’ and ‘y’ are variables ranging over “primitives”, that is, atomic
expressions; ‘N-V(x,y)’ denotes a sentence having x as its subject and y
as its predicate. So the principle seems to say that the result of apply-
ing CompN−V to the meanings of the primitives x and y is the mean-
ing of the result of applying the corresponding mode of combination to
the expressions x and y. But, so formulated, the principle makes no
sense. If terms of the form “dogs” are primitive, then quantification into
underlining is unintelligible. To put the point differently, when Hor-
wich speaks, in his formulation of COMP, both of primitives and of their
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meanings, he speaks in a way that requires us to construe terms of the
form “dogs” as semantically complex.10
So how do matters stand if we do treat terms like “dogs” as seman-
tically complex? Well, first of all, such terms would better be written
“ ‘dogs’ ”, for it is the meaning of “dogs” that this term is supposed to de-
note, not the meaning of dogs (whatever that may be). Just so we can be
clear about this, then, let us write such terms as: µ(‘dogs’). My version
of Horwich’s theory then takes the form:
• “dogs” means µ(‘dogs’);
• “bark” means µ(‘bark’);
• a sentence of the form N-V means: CompN−V (µ(N), µ(V ));
• “dogs bark” is a sentence of the form N-V;
• µ(N − V ) = CompN−V (µ(N), µ(V )).
Note that the last principle—which we may call a composition princi-
ple—takes the place of the relevant version of COMP.11
Let us look closely at the content of the composition principle. What
does it actually assert? The principle says that the meaning of a sen-
tence of a certain form is a certain function of the meanings of its parts,
and it gives us a name for that function, namely, “CompN−V ”. But
neither the composition principle nor the theory as a whole tells us
10 Horwich himself suggests a way of construing his theory on which terms like “dogs”
are treated as semantically complex: Formulating his theory in this way allows him to
finitely axiomatize it, and he knows some will think that desirable (524, fn.15/176-7).
My point is not that Horwich has overlooked the possibility of such a construal. It is,
rather, that this sort of construal is not just an option available to fetishists about finite
axiomatizability. On the contrary, it is required if the compositional principle at the
core of his theory is to be so much as intelligible.
It may be that Horwich intends COMP to be understood as a schema. I think it cannot
be so understood, but we need not pursue this issue, since Horwich appears willing to
accept the emendation. Moreover, although it is worth being clear about the points just
made, nothing in the arguments I am about to give depends upon them: It will be clear
that the arguments apply both to theories that treat “dogs” as primitive and to theories
that do not.
11 If one wanted to say that this theory is too trivial to be of any interest at all—
because all that is now being said is that “dog” means whatever “dog” means, and so
forth—I would be sympathetic. But one needs to be careful with the details of this
criticism. Horwich considers what looks to be a similar objection and seems unmoved
by it (506-7/157, fn. 5).
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anything about this function, other than that the meanings of expres-
sions and the function CompN−V should together satisfy the composi-
tion principle. That is, if we strip away the unexplained quasi-formal
machinery and focus simply on what direct meaning-theories actually
say, we see that their whole content amounts to this:
1. Sentences are composed of parts (in a sense the theory specifies).
2. The parts have meanings.
3. For each “mode of composition”, there is a function that yields the
meaning of a sentence so composed when it is given the meanings
of its parts as arguments.
No more content can be extracted from such a theory.
That is the essential point: Beyond its claim that sentences are ‘com-
posed’ of ‘parts’ and that these ‘parts’ have ‘meaning’, the only thing a
direct meaning-theory tells us—even one built upon a correct account of
sentential structure—is that, for each ‘mode of composition’, there is a
function that yields the meaning of a sentence of the appropriate form
when given the meanings of its parts as arguments, that is, that there is
a function satisfying the appropriate composition principle. Insofar as
such a theory purports to explain how sentence-meaning is determined
by word-meaning, it can therefore do so only in terms of the existence of
such a function, for that is all the theory asserts. But simply to assert
the existence of such a function is not to explain how the meaning of a
sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts: It is just to say,
in fancy language, that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the
meanings of its parts.12
That there is a function that yields the meaning of a sentence when
given the meanings of its parts as arguments implies that the mean-
ing of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts only in
a very weak sense: a purely mathematical sense. And functions are
cheap. Very cheap. In fact, the bare existence of a function satisfying a
direct meaning-theory’s composition principle follows from minimal as-
sumptions that have almost nothing to do with meaning and sentential
structure. The following three conditions, in particular, will suffice:
1. Sentences in some sense consist of ‘parts’.
12 Horwich considers such an objection and summarily dismisses it (516-7/167-8). But
there is more to the objection than he allows, as I shall now argue.
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2. No two sentences consist of the same ‘parts’.
3. Distinct expressions have distinct ‘meanings’.
No more is required: In particular, there is no reason that the ‘parts’ we
identify should be semantically relevant parts of the sentences of which
they are parts; nor need the ‘meanings’ associated with expressions in
any plausible sense be meanings.13 The sense in which direct meaning-
theories are insensitive to claims about sentential structure is thus not
just a proof-theoretic one: It is not just that one can formulate many
different such theories all of which deliver the wanted theorems. On the
contrary, so long as we are concerned only with the purely mathematical
sense of “determination”, it will be true to say that the meaning of a
sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts however we identify
its parts—that is, whatever structure we take the sentence to have—so
long as we require of the ‘meanings’ and ‘parts’ only that they satisfy
the three conditions just mentioned.
The point can be made more precise.
Consider the following view, sometimes ascribed to Frege. There is
a substantial, independent conception of the meanings of sentences (a
truth-conditional one, or whatever), but the only legitimate notion of the
meaning of a word (or other sub-sentential constituent) is insubstan-
tial: The meaning of a word simply consists in whatever ‘contribution’
it makes to the meanings of sentences in which it is contained. On this
sort of view, no matter what structures we might assign to sentences,
there will be a way of assigning meanings to their primitive parts so
that there is a function from the meanings of the parts to the mean-
ings of wholes: Simply assign different meanings to all the primitives
(unless, if you like, they are intersubstitutable salva significatione); the
existence of the required function is then a mathematical consequence
of the fact that no two different sentences consist of the same parts put
together in the same way. If we lack any independent conception of the
13 If this does not seem obvious, consider the following (which constitutes a proof).
Suppose someone said that the meaning of an expression is just that very expression
and that the structure of a sentence is just its obvious, orthographic structure (whence
the ‘parts’ of a sentence are just the words of which it is composed, in the usual sense).
Such a person could accept the sort of theory we’ve been discussing by interpreting µ
as the identity function and CompN−V as concatenation, and taking “means” to mean
“is identical with”. That is: Every direct meaning-theory can be truly interpreted as a
theory concerning not how the meanings of sentences are determined by the meanings
of their parts but how the identity of a sentence is determined by the identities of its
parts.
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meanings of the parts—if our only conception of what a part means is
that its meaning is its ‘contribution’ to the meanings of sentences—we
can have no independent “check” on whether the assignments of mean-
ings to parts is correct, and we cannot object to any such assignment
nor to any conception of structure.14
Similarly, suppose that we take ourselves to have a substantial, in-
dependent conception of the meanings of words (or of what constitutes
their meaning what they do), but regard as unnecessary any indepen-
dent conception of the meanings of sentences: A sentence’s meaning
what it does simply consists in its being composed in the way that it is of
words that mean what they do. Then again, no matter what structures
we might think sentences have, there is going to be a way of assigning
meanings to them so that there is a function from the meanings of the
parts to the meanings of wholes: Simply assign different meanings to
all of the sentences; the existence of the required function will then be a
mathematical consequence, once again, of the fact that no two sentences
consist of the same parts put together in the same way.
To see how ridiculous the situation can become, consider the follow-
ing direct-meaning theory:
1. ‘a’ means a
2. ‘b’ means b
. . .
26. ‘z’ means z
27. ‘ ’ means (there is a space there)
28. An expression of the form ξη means: Compc(the meaning of
ξ, the meaning of η).
(The operation here is, of course, concatenation.)
29. The meaning of the result of applying combinatorial proce-
dure C to a sequence of primitives = The result of applying
C to the sequence of the meanings of those primitives.
It is easy to derive from these axioms the theorem: “dogs bark” means
dogs bark. Thus we show how the meaning of a sentence is determined
14 This point is due in essentials to Michael Dummett (1991, ch. 6).
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by the meanings of the letters (and spaces) contained in it and how they
are put together.
Of course, the theory shows no such thing. But why not? It is not
because this theory takes sentences to be constructed from ‘parts’ that
don’t mean anything. For one thing, every dictionary I’ve ever seen lists
the letters, often as names of themselves, but sometimes with other
meanings, too (e.g., “a” can mean: shaped like an “a”). Moreover, even
if every letter isn’t, as things are, an independently meaningful expres-
sion, it is obvious to me that the above theory would still be unaccept-
able even if every string of English letters were a meaningful expres-
sion. Nor can one content oneself with the thought that the meaning of
a sentence just isn’t determined by the meanings of the letters of which
it is composed and how they are put together: In the purely mathemati-
cal sense, it is (modulo ambiguity and the like, which we, together with
Horwich, are ignoring).
What the foregoing shows is thus this. Suppose we have a direct
meaning-theory that operates with an insubstantial, or “deflationary”,
conception either of the meanings of words or of the meanings of sen-
tences. Then, given any conception of the structures of sentences, the
existence of functions satisfying the theory’s composition principles is
mathematically guaranteed. In particular, these functions will exist
whether or not sentences have the structures the theory assigns to them
in any plausible sense. The theory might, for example, regard the word
“catatonic” as composed of “cat”, “a”, and “tonic”. It makes no difference.
IV
One might worry that I must have made too little of Horwich’s constitu-
tive thesis. Perhaps the full force of this thesis is not captured by direct
meaning-theories, at least, not as I have formulated them. Let me begin
to address this worry, then, by discussing a quite different sort of exam-
ple, one Horwich himself uses to explain the force of the constitutive
thesis.
The way a complex expression sounds, Horwich remarks, is deter-
mined by the way its component parts sound and how they are com-
bined: The way “birds sing” sounds is determined by the way “birds”
sounds, the way “sing” sounds, and how they are combined in this sen-
tence. If we want to explain this fact, we can do so in a way reminiscent
of direct meaning-theories: We can say that the fact that a sentence
sounds the way it does simply consists in its being composed in a certain
14
way from words that themselves sound certain ways; for example, we
can say that the fact that “birds sing” sounds the way it does simply con-
sists in its being composed as it is from words that sound the way that
“birds” and “sing” do. Given this assumption, we can explain why “birds
sing” sounds the way it does by deriving the fact that it sounds σ(“birds
sing”) from the facts that “birds” sounds σ(“birds”), that “sing” sounds
σ(“sing”), and that “birds sing” is composed of those words in a certain
way (525-6/176). Doesn’t that seem like a good explanation? If so, the
obvious analogy between ‘direct sounding-theories’ and direct meaning-
theories should lead us to suspect that there is something wrong with
the argument that direct meaning-theories are explanatorily vacuous.
My response here is as above: If these ‘direct sounding-theories’ are
supposed to operate with an insubstantial, “deflationary” conception of
how sentences sound, they too explain nothing at all. The only thing
such a theory will assert is that there is a function from the way the
parts sound to the way that the whole sounds. The existence of such
a function is not only independent of any facts about how sentences
are actually structured—the argument given above applies here, too—
it is independent of how sentences in fact sound. That a sentence’s
sounding the way it does consists in its being composed in a certain
way from words that sound the way they do implies nothing at all about
how the sentence actually sounds: As far as the constitutive thesis is
concerned, “birds sing” could sound like “egg leg”. To think otherwise
is, most likely, to confuse the constitutive claim with a different one,
namely, that “birds sing” sounds how “birds” sounds followed by how
“sing” sounds. That claim has empirical content—it’s false—but it is no
longer just a constitutive claim, and the conception of how a complex ex-
pression sounds is no longer insubstantial. So long as direct sounding-
theories do operate with an insubstantial conception of how complex
expressions sound, however, they will fail to engage the empirical facts.
They therefore cannot possibly provide any explanation of those facts.
Similarly, Horwich’s constitutive claim regarding meaning—that for
a sentence to mean what it does is just for it to be composed in a certain
way from words with certain meanings—implies nothing at all about
what any sentence actually means. The constitutive thesis is, for exam-
ple, consistent with the claim that “dogs bark” means not that dogs bark
but that Oregon is in Ohio. To think otherwise is simply a mistake. So
direct meaning-theories, understood as operating with an insubstantial
conception of the meanings of sentences, fail to engage the empirical
facts. They therefore cannot provide any explanation of those facts.
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Let me emphasize that the foregoing does not show that Horwich’s
constitutive claim is false. What it shows is that the constitutive claim,
on its own, does not yield an explanation of compositionality. Consider
a weaker thesis: that the meaning of a sentence supervenes on how it is
composed of parts and what those parts mean. It is hard to imagine that
anyone would think that we can explain why “dogs bark” means what it
does simply by noting that its doing so supervenes on its structure and
the meanings of its parts. But if someone did want to take this line, the
arguments above would suffice to show that supervenience is too weak
a relation to support such an explanation (that being a familiar sort of
point, in any event). That does not mean that the supervenience claim
is false. Surely it is true.15 But the supervenience thesis only tells us
that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its
parts, whereas the question semantic theories purport to answer is how
the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts.
One might wonder whether the fact that Horwich speaks of constitu-
tion, rather than supervenience, ought to make a difference. But I just
do not see how it can do so: The whole point of the constitutive thesis is
supposed to be that it commits us, essentially, to nothing. The foregoing
amounts to little more than verification of its vacuity.
Horwich thus writes:
[T]here is nothing more to meaning what we do by ‘Socrates
is wise’ than using the words ‘Socrates’ and ‘wise’, and the
operation of predication, in the ways that are constitutive
of their meanings, and in appreciating how the sentence is
constructed from those three elements. (Horwich, 1998, p.
37, my emphasis)
But what is it to use the operation of predication in the way constitu-
tive of its meaning? What, indeed, is the meaning of predication? As
Higginbotham (1999, pp. 677–8) has emphasized, we are told nothing
about such matters, and that is no accident. Standardly, predication
is taken to be an operation that yields a sentence that is true if, and
only if, the denotation of the subject-term (which may of course be a
variable) is in the extension of the predicate (or has the property the
predicate expresses, or whatever). That is precisely not Horwich’s view.
15 It is another question, obviously, whether compositionality is itself to be character-
ized in terms of supervenience (Szabó, 2000). My own view, for what it’s worth, is that
compositionality is better characterized in epistemic terms (Heck, 2004).
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Lacking any substantial conception of what sentences mean—that is, of
the result of predication—Horwich cannot have a substantial conception
of the semantic significance of predication. All he can say about pred-
ication is that, operating on words with certain meanings, it yields a
sentence whose meaning what it does consists in its being constructed,
by predication, from words with those meanings: That is, the sentence
will mean whatever sentences mean that are constructed by predication
from words that mean whatever those words mean. That cannot fail to
be correct, but it is the most boring of tautologies. Horwich’s constitu-
tive thesis thus adds no explanatory force to direct meaning-theories.
V
I conclude that direct meaning-theories have no explanatory force. If
not, then no “trivial” explanation of how a sentence’s meaning is deter-
mined by the meanings of its parts appears to be available. Indeed, we
may conclude more: In order for a non-trivial explanation to be possi-
ble, we must operate with non-deflationary conceptions of the meanings
both of sentences and of their parts. Then things are quite different.
Consider, for example, a broadly truth-theoretic semantic theory accord-
ing to which the semantic value of a predicate is its extension; that of
a sentence, its truth-value. In the context of such a theory, the claim
that adverbs are predicate modifiers implies that there is a function
taking us from the extension of “ate brocolli” to the extension of “ate
brocolli passionately”. It is not mathematically provable that there is
any such function, which is a good thing, since there is no such function.
If there were such a function, then, if “ate brocolli” and “ate cauliflower”
were co-extensional, then “Jane ate brocolli passionately” and “Jane ate
cauliflower passionately” would have to be materially equivalent. But
they need not be, even if “ate brocolli” and “ate cauliflower” happen to
be co-extensional.16
16 Thanks to Michael Glanzberg, Bob Hale, Jim Higginbotham, Paul Pietroski,
Michael Rescorla, and Jason Stanley, for helpful discussion and reaction to earlier
drafts of this material. Talks based upon it were given at the University of Glasgow
and Vassar College. Thanks to the audiences at both places for their comments.
This paper was originally written in 1999, but I never published it. Material from it
found its way into another paper on compositionality (Heck, 2004), but that one too has
remained unpublished. So I am pleased finally to see it published here.
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